War and Economics: Spanish Civil War Finances Revisited by Martin-Acena, Pablo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
War and Economics: Spanish Civil War
Finances Revisited
Pablo Martin-Acena and Elena Martinez Ruiz and Maria A.
Pons Brias
Universidad de Alcala-Madrid
May 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22833/
MPRA Paper No. 22833, posted 22. May 2010 23:05 UTC
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
War and Economics:  Spanish Civil War Finances Revisited  
Pablo Martín-Aceña (Universidad de Alcalá) 
Elena Martínez Ruiz** (Universidad de Alcalá) 
María A. Pons (Universidad de Valencia) 
 
Abstract: This paper reviews how the Spanish civil war was financed. We present new 
evidence to show that the two combatant parties, the Republican government and the 
Franco administration followed similar financial strategies. In both cases money 
creation, rather than new taxes or the issue of debt, was the main mechanism used to 
cover the expenses of the war. We argue, contrary to the established knowledge, that 
both sides consumed a similar amount of domestic and foreign resources. We also argue 
that the Spanish Republic did not lose the war because of a lack of means. International 
factors, such as the Non-Intervention agreement promoted by France and Great Britain, 
and the military setbacks of the Republican army during the first year of the war, were 
decisive for  Franco’s  victory  in 1939.  
 
 
 
JEL: N14, N44 
Keywords: Spain, civil war, financial resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Corresponding author: 
Departamento de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia Económica 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas 
Plaza de la Victoria 3 
28802 Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) 
SPAIN 
elena.martinez@uah.es
 2
War and Economics:  Spanish Civil War Finances Revisited (*).  
 
Economic conditions affect the development and outcomes of wars. In 
particular, the amount of resources available to the warring parties is usually a 
determinant of the final result. An advantage in resources can be readily transformed 
into military superiority in order to better meet the needs not only of the war effort, but 
also of the rearguard, essential for keeping up the moral of the population. Resource 
superiority usually reflects a higher level of economic development, which in turn 
allows for greater flexibility in adapting the productive structure to the necessities of the 
war. 
This argument has been confirmed for the case of the two world wars where the 
final outcome has been considered “primarily a matter of levels of economic 
development of each side and the scale of resources that they wielded”1. This was also 
certainly the case of the American civil war, where the Union’s more developed markets 
and industrial base are considered key factors in the final outcome of the conflict, as the 
North was able to spend roughly twice as much on the war effort as the South2. 
The Spanish civil war seems to contradict this general conclusion. When civil 
strife started in July 1936 and the Spanish economy was divided in two, most of the 
industrial base and the financial wealth were concentrated in the area controlled by the 
legitimate Republican government. And yet the Republicans lost the war three years 
later, when in March 1939 General Franco´s Army claimed total victory over a 
demoralized Republican Army. The prevailing explanation for this apparent 
contradiction has been that the Republican defeat was partially due to a gross 
mismanagement of the resources at their disposal. This interpretation originated from a 
report published in 1940 by the Francoist minister of Finance and former head of the 
research department of the Bank of Spain, José Larraz3. In his report, Larraz sustained 
that both parties spent a great deal, although he pointed out that the Republican 
government spent larger sums than the so-called national government. The document 
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pointed out the "squandering" of "red finances" in contrast to the austerity of "national 
finances". The " Larraz Report" was intended to demonstrate how Franco’s economic 
authorities managed the economy in efficient and orthodox fashion, while the 
Republicans pillaged and wasted the real and financial resources of the country. 
Larraz´s report has since been the basis of every account explaining the financing of the 
war. 
We argue that, contrary to the established knowledge, there was not much 
different between the two sides, either in the quantity of funds spent or in their financial 
strategies. Both sides were forced to resort to all possible means to meet the huge 
expenditure requirements of the three years of conflict. Taxes, requisition, confiscation, 
payment moratoria, sale of assets, borrowing and money creation were used to finance 
the war effort. External sources were also significant. Franco borrowed from Germany 
and Italy, while the Republicans depleted their holdings of foreign exchange reserves. 
All in all, the two parties spent similar amounts. We also argue that external factors and 
the course of the war, and not the economic management on behalf of the Republican 
Government, were the determinant factors that explain the final result of the war. While 
Hitler and Mussolini sustained Franco, the Republicans did not have the support of the 
democratic nations and only Stalin was ready to supply them with arms. Moreover, the 
Republicans` continuous military setbacks during the first year reduced their economic 
power and that tilted the economic balance in favor of the rebel administration and 
army.  
This paper reviews how the Spanish civil war was financed. We present new 
evidence and new data that allow us to provide a detailed and more balanced analysis of 
the financial strategy and the volume of resources employed by the two combatant 
parties. The first section presents background information. The second section examines 
the internal and external sources used by both the Republican Treasury and Franco’s 
administration to cover the cost of the war. The third section provides quantitative 
evidence of war expenditures on both sides. The fourth section explores the relationship 
between money and prices and the paper ends with some brief conclusions4. 
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1. Spain at War: 1936-1939 
The civil war has been one of the most significant events in the history of 
contemporary Spain. The war lasted nearly three years, from July 1936, when a military 
coup attempted to overthrow the constitutional government of the Second Republic, to 
March 1939. The war finished with the establishment of an authoritarian and 
undemocratic regime that introduced vast changes into Spanish society. Furthermore, 
the military rebellion of July 1936 put an end to a long period of parlamentarism and 
interrupted a slow but continuous process of economic modernization that since 1900 
had seen the Spanish income per capita converge with that of the most advanced 
European nations.  
On the eve of the war, Spanish industry, armed forces and diplomacy were 
entirely unprepared for any kind of war, civil or international, short or long. In 1935, the 
level of public expenditure stood at around 13 % of GDP. Reported military spending 
was low, at around 16 % of total budget expenditure5. The quantity and quality of the 
military equipment and supplies was clearly insufficient to wage a long confrontation. 
The rebel forces planned a coup d’etat and expected to seize power in a few days. But 
as the Republic did not crumble, the military coup turned into a drawn-out and 
devastating war6. 
The military uprising split the country in two, each with its own separate 
government. The war broke the financial and monetary union of the country. Although 
the headquarters of the main banks and saving banks remained in the territory under the 
control of Republican authorities, many branches and a large number of regional and 
local financial institutions operated independently in the area occupied by the military 
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5
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forces commanded by general Franco. Two central banks (one in Madrid and another in 
Burgos) and two "pesetas" (the former Spanish currency) coexisted during the war. 
Financial institutions on both sides were closely supervised. Moreover, Republican 
authorities suspended the operations of the Stock Exchange, took measures to defer the 
redemption and payment of interest on public debt and declared a moratorium on bank 
mortgages. They also introduced rigorous foreign exchange controls and enforced strict 
measures to regulate the financial system. The Franco administration adopted similar 
measures: price and exchange controls were introduced and the financial system was 
subjected to strict regulations7. 
 On paper, with more developed markets and an industrial base that could 
ultimately produce the goods needed for war, the Republican government was clearly in 
a better position to face the challenge of mobilizing resources and defeating the rebels. 
The Republican territory encompassed 60 per cent of the country´s population (around 
14 million inhabitants), the main commercial cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, 
Valencia), practically the entire industrial base concentrated in Catalonia, the Basque 
country, Asturias and the main agrarian exporting area in the Mediterranean coast. They 
also controlled the central administration apparatus and had a financial advantage that 
included all the metallic (gold and silver) reserves of the Bank of Spain. The rebels, on 
the other hand, had virtually no manufacturing industry to produce military supplies and 
without any initial financial resources relied entirely on private donations and on funds 
borrowed from abroad to purchase foreign supplies. The only initial advantages Franco 
had were the control of large grain producing regions and the support and aid of many 
entrepreneurs, firm managers and financiers that jumped into the rebel zone 
immediately after the outbreak of the war. 
However, the initial advantages of the Republic soon began to vanish. Firstly, 
because of internal political conflicts within its own territory. In the first weeks of the 
war, the central government had to face a revolutionary movement led by socialist and 
anarchist trade unions and by independent and uncontrolled peasants and workers´ 
committees. In Catalonia and the Basque country, separatist groups claimed total 
independence and authorities in Barcelona and Bilbao demanded more political 
autonomy assuming “de facto” legislative powers until then in the hands of the Spanish 
Parliament in Madrid. The central government was overrun by all these events, its 
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power was reduced and its legitimacy undermined. In contrast, the generals that 
commanded the rebellion avoided the political turmoil that plagued the Republicans. 
They suppressed all workers’ organizations and political parties, imposed strict 
domestic order and militarized the industrial infrastructure in its zone. That does not 
imply they had a plan to organize a war economy. Rather the unexpected resistance of 
the Republic surprised the rebels and they were forced to establish a brand new 
administration with serious coordination problems and disagreements about the best 
economic strategy to follow.  
Secondly, the international scenario in the 1930s did not help the Republic’s 
cause. The "non-intervention accord" promoted by Paris and London and signed in the 
month of September 1936 by 34 nations, drastically reduced the initial economic 
superiority of the Republic. The accord precluded the sale of arms to either of the two 
sides, but in fact penalized the Republic, as Franco’s army was from the very beginning 
of the war well supplied by its ideological allies, Germany and Italy, which blatantly 
disregarded the accord. Although the Soviet Union also ignored the arms embargo, the 
military equipment sent by Stalin to the Republic never matched the quantity or quality 
of the war material sent by Hitler and Mussolini8. Another difference was that the 
Soviet dictator requested payment in cash (gold), while Nazi and fascist leaders 
extended unlimited amounts of credit to Franco until the end of the war. 
Finally, we must mention the course of the war itself. In a few weeks, the 
military rebels were able to almost entirely capture the west side of the country 
(bordering Portugal) and cut off the North coast from the main Republican zone around 
Madrid and the Mediterranean coast. In June 1937, when the rebel army occupied the 
most developed Northern provinces, with the largest coal deposits, the iron and steel 
industries, the shipyards and the merchant fleet, the economic balance shifted in their 
favor. Moreover, the constant expansion of the territory under the control of the 
nationalist army put most of the arable land of the country in their hands, which allowed 
them to feed the population and avoid the shortages suffered by the inhabitants of  
Republican cities. 
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2. Financing the War: How the War was Paid for 
There are four ways of paying for a war: taxation, public borrowing on the 
domestic market, borrowing from foreign markets and money creation9. War financing 
methods have varied greatly, depending on internal and external constraints, 
institutional factors and on the length and intensity of the conflict. Evidence shows that 
governments have financed wars by using a mixture of direct contemporaneous taxes, 
debt and money creation. Adam Smith argued that taxes were the best method of 
financing because they conveyed the real cost of wars to the general public. A.C. Pigou 
added debt, although he considered this policy as equivalent to taxation. John Maynar 
Keynes suggested that money creation would be acceptable until the point of full 
employment was reached. Moreover, Keynes argued against the use of debt financing 
and wrote in favor of the use of rationing and price controls. At any rate, available 
evidence shows that all wars have resulted in significant inflation, as all armies have 
always resorted to money creation10. 
 
Internal financing  
 Taxes were not a significant source of income for either of the two combatant 
parties. Neither of the contenders introduced major changes in the tax system. Most of 
the measures merely raised some tax rates or duties and only in the last month of the 
conflict was a tax on excess profits introduced11.  
 We have no aggregate data for taxes in the Republican zone. We know, 
however, that the Republican fiscal administration collapsed in the first months of the 
war and it took almost a year to rebuild it. The revolutionary organizations suppressed 
what they considered “capitalist taxes”, blocking the collection of land rents; and the 
confiscation of private property and of many industrial companies and service firms 
interrupted the payment of corporate and other taxes, as Comín and Lopez (2008) have 
pointed out. An official report released by the bureau of the Prime Minister, Juan 
Negrín, on February 8, 1938, indicated that in the first months of the war total revenues 
                                                 
9
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(2000) and Cárdenas and Manns (1992) wrote about the Mexican Civil War and Gatrell (1994) about 
Russia. 
11
 An extensive review of tax legislation on the Francoist side is available in Martorell and Comín (2008). 
Pons (2006) provides information on taxation on the Republican side. 
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from taxes dropped abruptly, although later there was a slight recovery12. Income from 
all taxes during the second semester of 1936 amount to around 420 million pesetas, well 
short of the 2,000 million pesetas collected in 1935 over the same period. Tax revenues 
increased to 550 millions pesetas in the second semester of 1937, a figure that suggests 
some improvement in the Republican fiscal administration. This fragmented 
information indicates that the government was able to collect 1,200 million pesetas at 
the most during a fiscal year, considerably less than the 4,140 million pesetas in the 
1935 budget. 
 The figures available for Catalonia and Valencia tell a similar story. In Catalonia 
revenue from taxation fell dramatically from 45 million pesetas in 1935 to 9.4 million in 
193713. The data for Valencia, displayed in table 1, also confirm the reduction in tax 
revenues, from 50.9 million pesetas in 1936 to 8.4 million in 1937 and to a low of 3.7 
million pesetas in 1938.   
 
Table 1. Tax revenues in Valencia (in thousands of pesetas) 
 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Property tax     
January 28 - -  
June 2,278 739 765  
December 843 
 
1,719  3,160 
Tax on profits and rental income     
January 44,377 828 919  
June 1,803 2,228 2,040  
December 
 
1,533 2,853  982 
Total Revenues 50,862 8,367 3,724 4,142 
Source: Archivo del Antic Regne de Valencia, Intervención de Hacienda, Legajos 5781-5782. 
 
 The official figures for zone under Franco´s control are shown in table 2. They 
display a rising trend as the rebel army occupied the largest areas of the peninsula. 
Revenue from taxes was nonetheless relatively modest. In fact, in the last year of the 
war, when the Francoists already controlled two thirds of the territory, tax revenues only 
represented 38 % of the amount collected in 1935.  
 
                                                 
12
 Juan Negrín (1938): “Al Servicio del Pueblo. Un hombre contra el caso. La Hacienda y la Economía de 
la república en plena guerra”,  Barcelona, 8 febrero 1938. Archivo Juan Negrín, Legajo 136.   
13
 Generalitat de Catalunya (1937), vol. I 
 
 9
Table 2. Tax revenues in Francoist Spain 
 Millions of 
pesetas 
2nd half 1936 396 
1st half 1937 552 
2nd half 1937 680 
1st half 1938 791 
2nd half 1938 847 
1st quarter1939 418 
TOTAL 3,684 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (1940) 
 
Neither of the two sides resorted to issuing debt, although the Republicans made 
an attempt to in the last year of war, without success. This decision to forego the use of 
internal debt as a method of financing is surprising, as both sides were in great need of 
resources. The decision, however, can be understood if we take into account that the 
authorities in both zones temporarily suspended the payments on the outstanding debt, 
making investor interest in new issues unlikely.  
Instead, both contenders made extensive use of confiscation and expropriation of 
goods and properties of families and firms considered to sympathize with the enemy. 
There is little evidence of the amount of funds obtained in this manner. In the case of 
the Republicans, in the first months of the war confiscations were made through illegal 
(or at least alegal) procedures. As a result, there are no figures accounting for the 
amounts collected. From December 1936, the General Directorate of Security 
(Dirección General de Seguridad) through the Caja de Reparaciones (War Reparations 
Fund) became the organism responsible for all sorts of confiscations14. However, most 
of these funds were put aside with the aim of financing the reconstruction of the country 
after the war and were eventually used to finance the activities of the Republican 
government in exile. 
 The confiscation of assets in retaliation for political opposition was a significant 
source of revenue for the Francoist administration, even long after the war had finished. 
Expropriations were not confined to those that were suspected of being political 
opponents. For instance, general Queipo de Llano, commander of the Francoist troops 
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in Western Andalusia, decreed the confiscation of all property and assets he deemed 
useful to sustain the war effort, from motor vehicles and buildings to mining production. 
British firm Riotinto was one of the first to suffer this type of requisitions, as nearly 
60% of all pyrite extracted during the war was confiscated and sent to Germany in 
compensation for the aid received from the Nazi regime. This was by no means the only 
case. The production from the Rif and Setolazar mines was also used to compensate 
German aid. While there is no estimation of total confiscations on the Franco side, 
scattered evidence suggests that they were substantial. For example, the magnitude of 
the requisitions undertaken by the Francoist authorities in Andalusia led one of Queipo 
de Llano´s associates, Antonio Bahamonde, to state that property rights were more 
secure under the Government of the Popular Front than in Francoist zones15.   
The Francoists also asked for voluntary contributions, although it is difficult to 
know whether these contributions were truly voluntary, as the military authorities used 
various forms of coercion to force donations.16 The drive for funds was initiated by the 
so-called National Subscription established in August 1936, asking the population to 
donate jewellery and gold. The quantitative relevance of these contributions remains 
unknown, although Viñas (1976) has estimated that they may have amounted to 668 
gold ingots weighing a total of 3.5 tons, and to 162 silver ingots17. 
The main source of internal financing of both sides was money creation. By 
means of advances and credits from the Bank of Spain the Republic raised more than 
24,000 million pesetas. According to the provisional budgets mentioned below, the total 
expenditures of the Republican government during the war amounted to 40,000 million 
pesetas. We can therefore deduce that the issue of new money represented 60% of the 
Republicans’ total revenue, as shown in table 3. As regards the Francoist Treasury, the 
deficit during the war, that is, expenses over the tax revenues amounted to 8,260 million 
pesetas, according to Larraz. Out of this figure, 7,200 million were covered by loans and 
advances from the nationalist Bank of Spain, and the rest (1,060 million) by debit 
balances in different accounts of the Bank. All in all, new money accounted for almost 
70 percent of the acknowledged internal expenses of the civil and military 
administration of the nationalist State during the war, as can also be seen in table 3. If 
all these figures are correct, and we believe they are, it means that the financial strategy 
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of both combatants was quite similar. As a result, it cannot be argued that Francoist 
policy was more orthodox than that of the Republicans18. 
 
Table 3. Bank of Spain Loans and Advances 1936-1939 (millions of pesetas) 
 Republican zone Francoist zone 
Credit lines  24,000 7,200 
Debit balances   1,060 
Total 24,000 8,260 
Percentages of total expenditures (%) 60 69 
 
Note: the figures for total expenditures used to compute the percentages in the last row are shown in table 
7 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (1940) and Pons (2006) 
 
External financing 
 Foreign resources to pay for the war were especially relevant because Spain did 
not have the capacity to produce military goods. Hence, imports were essential to 
maintain the war effort. Franco was able to purchase his military equipment with 
German and Italian "aid" and with loans from private banks in Portugal, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. The most important source, because of its magnitude and 
strategic significance, was the so-called aid received from the Axis powers, which 
included troops, military experts and military supplies on credit. The terms under which 
this financial assistance was provided varied over time and from country to country. 
The mechanism, timing and control of the funds were always in the hands of the nations 
providing the aid. Nonetheless, in all cases it was agreed that the advances and credits 
were to be settled at the end of the conflict. In fact, the total amount to be paid by 
Spanish authorities was established in bilateral diplomatic negotiations once the war 
was over. As shown in table 4, the Franco civil and military administration borrowed as 
much as 760 million dollars. 
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Table 4. Foreign loans (Francoist) 
  Million Dollars (million) 
Axis powers aid Italy 8,300 lire 447 
Germany 732.6 RM 295.4 
Loans from Portuguese 
financial institutions 
  6.76 
Loans from other sources   10.97 
TOTAL    760.12 
Sources: Martínez Ruiz (2006a). In the case of Germany, all the aid provided and not only the outstanding 
debt has been considered. See Martín-Aceña, Martínez Ruiz and Pons (2010) 
 
In contrast, the Republic did not receive any significant foreign financial 
assistance, except a minor Soviet credit in 1938 (around 70 million dollars). The 
Republican government did not float debt in London, Paris or New York, in spite of 
having a large amount of gold to be used as guarantee. The reasons for this decision are 
controversial: either they were not able to do so because of the political aversion of 
international banks and financiers, or it was a deliberate policy decision. 
Although the Republican government did not resort to external borrowing, it was 
not short of international means of payment, as they controlled most of the gold and 
silver reserves of the Bank of Spain. At the outbreak of the civil war, the metallic 
reserves in the Bank of Spain that could be mobilised to finance the war amounted to 
about 635 tones of fine gold, equivalent to 715 million dollars. These reserves were 
ranked fourth in the world, behind the reserves held by the Federal Reserve System, the 
Bank of France and the Bank of England (and excluding the Soviet Gosbank reserves). 
This huge amount of gold had been accumulated during the First World War, thanks to 
the special conditions created through Spain remaining neutral. For four years in a row 
the balance of payments in the current account ended with a surplus, which in turn led 
to an inflow of foreign exchange that was invested in gold coins and ingots. By the end 
of the war, the Republican government had used up these reserves completely to 
purchase military equipment, ammunition, food and raw materials abroad19.  
 The sale of the gold reserves was carried out in two stages. First, the Bank of 
France acquired 174 tones of fine gold, for which the Republican government obtained 
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 For more information about the sale and final use of the gold reserves, see Viñas (1976) and also 
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3,922 million francs (around 196 million dollars). In the second stage, all the remaining 
gold, 510 tones (equivalent to 460 tones of fine gold valued at 520 million dollars) was 
sent to the USSR and deposited in Moscow in the vaults of the Gossbank, the Soviet 
central bank. In 1937 and 1938, the Gossbank bought 426 tons of fine gold from the 
Republican government, which in exchange obtained 245 million dollars, 42 million 
pounds and 375 million francs. Of these sums, the Soviet government retained 132 
million dollars as payment for supplies, and the rest was transferred to Paris to different 
accounts in the Banque Commerciale por L’Europe du Nord (a Soviet financial 
institution in Paris). The Republic used these accounts to pay for all types of war 
supplies, such as aircrafts, tanks, artillery, rifles, and ammunition. The money was also 
used to buy foodstuffs and raw materials. The purchases were made in Brussels, Prague, 
Warsaw, New York and other parts of the world. Moreover, when most of the gold had 
gone, the silver holdings of the Bank (1,225 tons) were put up for sale. At this time, the 
main buyers were the United States Treasury and the Bank of France. In exchange, the 
Republican government received around 15 million dollars. There were also some silver 
sales to private French and Belgian firms that yielded an additional 5 million dollars. 
Table 5 summarizes the sales and the income obtained from them. 
 
Table 5. Sales of Bank of Spain 
  Alloy gold (tons) Fine gold (tons) Dollars (millions) 
Gold 1936 194 174 195.8 
1937 415 374 394.6 
1938  67.5 75 
Total  615.6 665.4 
Silver 1938   20 
TOTAL    685.4  
Sources: Sardá (1970), Viñas (1976) 
 
 To send and deposit the Bank of Spain´s gold in Moscow was an extravagant 
decision that sparked a heated debate among contemporary politicians, a debate that has 
continued until our days. When the war broke out, the reserves were kept in the 
subterranean vaults of the Bank in Madrid. But in September, when the government 
feared the capital city might fall to the rebel army, the minister of Finance ordered the 
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transfer of the gold and silver deposit to a naval store in the city of Cartagena on the 
Mediterranean coast. From there, the remaining gold, the initial deposit less the amount 
that had already been sold to the Bank of France, was loaded onto four Soviet vessels 
and shipped to Odessa and later to Moscow in a special train convoy. One widely 
accepted explanation sustains that as the Soviet Union was the only country prepared to 
help the Spanish Republic, the Gossbank was the most suitable place to deposit the 
gold. However, Martin-Aceña (2001, 2008) has argued that the Republican ministry of 
Finance had other options (such as London, Paris, Zurich or New York), which were not 
considered. While this is true, the non-intervention agreement promoted by France and 
Great Britain and the reluctance of the democratic powers to support the Republican 
government may have influenced the minister’s final decision. He might have believed 
that the authorities that had signed the agreement would have taken steps to block the 
gold reserves once transferred to their territory. And yet, at the same time, the gold was 
being sold in Paris with no difficulty whatsoever. Another plausible explanation is that 
Stalin and the Soviet agents in Madrid pressed, or forced, the Spanish minister of 
Finance to ship the gold to Moscow to guarantee payment of the military supplies that 
were already arriving at the ports of Barcelona and Valencia. 
Moving on, the figures in table 6 show that both parties also spent the same 
amount of foreign funds, although the lenders and the origin of the money were 
different. The Republican government obtained 769 million dollars from their dealings 
with the Soviets, a similar figure to the 760 million dollars that Franco received from 
his political allies, Germany and Italy. 
 
Table 6. Total Foreign Means of Payment (millions of dollars) 
  
Francoist 
administration 
Republican 
government 
Allies credits (aid)  749.16 70 
Assets sales Gold  665.4 
 
Silver  20 
 
Others 10.97 14 
TOTAL  760.13 769.4 
Source: see text 
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3. War Expenditures: Which Side Spent the Most Financial Resources? 
At the outbreak of the war, the prevailing budget was that of 1932, which was 
continuously extended in subsequent years. The official budget, however, did not 
include all the expenditure on behalf of the Republican government during the war, as 
was recently explained by Pons (2006). In February 1939, the Ministry of Finance 
produced an internal document summarizing budgetary expenses for 1936, 1937 and 
193820. This summary, which was never published, distinguished among ordinary, 
extraordinary and undisclosed credits. Only the first two were included in the budget 
published in the Official Gazette. When the figures of the undisclosed credits are taken 
into consideration, the picture that emerges is completely different to that portrayed by 
the official figures in the Gazette. According to this new evidence, Republican 
expenditure during the war multiplied five-fold, from 5,752 million pesetas in 1936 to 
21,335 million pesetas in 1938. As can be seen in table 7, the amount spent by the 
Republicans totalled 40,335 million pesetas. More than half of this figure was spent on 
military goods and services. That is, in 1937, the Ministry of War received 54 % of the 
total budget expenses and this percentage rose to 67 % in 1938. 
On the other hand, and according to the data compiled by Larraz in 1940, the 
budgetary expenses of the Francoist administration only rose by 11,894 million pesetas, 
less than a third of that recorded in the Republican budget. Therefore, if these figures 
are accurate, the figures in table 7 would seem to validate Larraz´s claim that Franco 
won the war despite the considerable difference in the volume of expenditure on behalf 
of the two sides. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Pons (2006) provides the figures of this internal document. 
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Table 7. Total Expenditure (Millions of pesetas) 
  
Francoist administration 
 
Republican government 
 
1936 Dec. 819 5,752 
1937 June  1,291  
 Dec. 2,252 13,217 
1938 June  2,602  
 Dec. 3,208 21,335 
1939 March 1,722  
Total  11,894 40,304 
Sources: Larraz (1940) and Pons (2006). 
 
However, the official accounts prepared by the Ministry of Finance after the war 
do not reflect the real budgetary position of the Francoist administration entirely, 
because a large volume of military supplies were not paid during the three years of the 
conflict. Larraz estimated that the total amount of deferrals represented about 800 
million pesetas (500 million corresponding to supplies and construction work and 300 
million to military transport). But even this figure still underestimates the unpaid war 
bills of the Franco administration. In fact, in the official government budgets for the 
years 1940 to 1946, an additional amount of 8,060 million pesetas was included to 
cover debts and expenditure made during the war, the payment of which had been 
postponed. 22% of this figure went towards the interest and principal of the public debt 
and more than 50% for military supplies to the Army. The rest were other deferred 
payments of war-related expenditure made by the Air Force, the Navy and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs21. 
Moreover the Francoists also took drastic measures to reduce all expenditure not 
directly linked to the war effort. For instance, civil servants’ salaries were cut and they 
were forced to contribute to the war effort with one or days of their monthly salary. The 
Francoist military administration also had a minimal institutional structure, not having 
to finance institutions such as the Parliament or the Constitutional Guarantees Court22. 
Republican war prisoners contributed to the reduction in expenditure as well. A decree 
of May 1937 established that prisoners could be put to work, mostly in the construction 
sector, without pay, a measure that might have had a significant saving impact. 
                                                 
21
 Data in Comín and Diaz Fuentes (2005) 
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Although unknown, the total expenditure of Franco’s army and administration during 
the war exceeded the figure calculated by Larraz in his report. If we add both the 11.9 
million pesetas in table 7 and the 8.1 million pesetas of the officially recognized 
deferred payments, then the amount spent by the Francoist side rises to 20 million, 
which still falls short of the amount spent by the Republicans, although the gap is 
substantially smaller. 
On the other hand, it must be taken into account that prices behaved differently 
in the two zones. The inflation rate was consistently higher in the Republican territory 
than in area under Franco´s control. Unfortunately, we only have wholesale prices for 
the entire period of war for the Francoist side, while official prices on the Republican 
side are only available for the first year of the war.. Table 8 includes the information 
available for the two zones for the first twelve months of the war. It can be observed 
that prices rose rapidly in Republican Spain. They doubled between July 1936 and 
March 1937, while on the contrary, in the rebel zone, prices seem to have remained 
quite stable, recording a moderate increase of only 15%. 
 
Table 8. Wholesale Prices (July 1936=100) 
  Republican zone Francoist zone 
  National  Barcelona National 
1936 July 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 August 102.0 102.4 101.5 
 September 109.7 104.8 102.1 
 October 117.2 111.2 105.1 
 November 129.4 116.1 106.1 
 December 149.0 120.0 107.2 
1937 January 166.2 128.1 111.2 
 February 179.9 139.9 112.2 
 March 202.2 152.5 113.1 
 April 234.6 168.5 112.5 
 May  170.3 114.0 
 June  173.8 113.8 
 July  180.8 114.2 
Sources: Miguel (1944). For Barcelona, Maluquer de Motes i Bernet (2008) 
 
Official prices were also published on a monthly basis for Spain’s nationalist 
territory. This information was later used by Miguel (1944) to produce a price index for 
                                                                                                                                               
22
 See Martorell and Comín (2008) 
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the entire war period, which has been included in table 9. The index shows relative price 
stability in the Francoist zone until the end of the war.   
 
Table 9. Official Wholesale Price Index for the Francoist Zone (1936-1939) 
1936 July 100 1938 March 125 
 
Sept 102 
 
June  127 
 
Dec 107 
 
Sept 130 
1937 March 113 
 
Dec 137 
 
June  114 1939 March 141 
 
Sept 116 
 
  
 
Dec 121 
 
  
Sources: Miguel (1944) 
In contrast, we do not have official prices for the Republican zone after August 
1937. To offset this lack of information we have used two different series. One is an 
estimation made by Miguel in 1944. According to this author, after July 1937 prices 
rose exponentially, unleashing uncontrollable hyperinflation and a simultaneous flight 
from currency (a typical phenomenon for the currency of the losing side in a military 
conflict). 
In order to test the plausibility of Miguel’s series and to improve our 
information, we have attempted to construct a new estimate using the French franc 
exchange rate of the peseta and the French wholesale price index23. According to the 
absolute version of the standard purchasing power theory, the exchange rate should 
reflect the inflation differential. Taking into account this theoretical identity, we have 
conducted a purchasing power parity exercise to obtain a price index and compare it to 
the estimate published by Miguel. The two series are presented in figure 1. It can be 
seen that the new index replicates that of Miguel until mid-1938, although our 
estimation is below his index. In the summer of 1938, our index shows that Republican 
prices seem to have reached a plateau that coincided with the decisive Ebro battle in 
which the Republicans obtained a temporary victory over the Franco army. Afterwards, 
the rapid advance of the rebel army towards the Mediterranean coast led to a flight from 
the Republican peseta and to an upturn in the inflation rate. 
 
                                                 
23
 Wholesale prices for France (1937-1939) in 
http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter04.html 
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Figure 1. Wholesale Prices in the Republican Zone (January 1937=100) 
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Sources: Miguel (1944), and our estimates 
 
 
The evolution of the exchange rate of the nationalist peseta, shown in figure 2, 
also provides an alternative indicator for the behaviour of the prices in the zone 
controlled by the rebels. The evidence suggests that the Franco peseta did indeed lose 
more value than official price figures suggest, dropping by 33% against the French franc 
between July and December 1938 and by 51% against the dollar. Such a fall in the 
external value of the Francoist peseta was not reflected in the official price index, which 
only registered a 10% decrease in the same period24. Moreover, the data suggest that the 
stability of the Francoist peseta only lasted until the end of 1937. 
                                                 
24
 Once again it seems that either the system of price controls and rationing established by the Francoists 
was very effective, or the price statistics recorded by the Francoist authorities failed to capture the 
movements in black markets. The information on prices on black markets during the war is scarce but it is 
worth mentioning can be pointed out that the price of bread in 1943 was 800% higher than the official 
price.  
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Figure 2. Exchange Rates of the Two Pesetas in Paris 
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Table 10 below compares the overall expenditure of both sides using the official 
price index to deflate the Francoist figures and our new estimated price index to deflate 
the Republican figures. The expenditure picture that emerges in the two territories is 
quite different from that shown in table 7. When nominal figures are transformed into 
real values, the expenditure of both sides seems to have been quite similar: 9.4 and 8.0 
billion pesetas.  
 
Table 10. Total Expenditure (millions of pesetas 1936) 
  Francoist  
administration  
Republican  
government  
1936 Dec. 765 3,940 
1937 June  1,133  
 Dec. 1,861 2,421 
1938 June  2,049  
 Dec. 2,342 1,576 
1939 March 1,221  
Total  9,371 7,937 
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The caveats made above and the data presented in table 10 challenge the 
commonly accepted idea that the Republican government spent substantially more than 
the administration of Franco’s rebel army. Although the assertion is true when the 
comparison is made in nominal terms, the figures in real terms tell quite a different 
story. They suggest that their actual purchasing power was relatively similar or even 
favourable to the Francoists if all the deferred payments are included. 
 
4. Why did the Republicans Suffer Higher Inflation? 
We already know the financial resources consumed by both the Republican 
government and the Franco administration. As proven in one of the previous sections, 
the two sides relied almost entirely on money creation to pay for their domestic current 
expenditure. The increase in the amount of money far greater than the growth in 
production of new goods and services led to strong inflationary pressures that were 
particularly pronounced in the territory under Republican rule. In fact, one could argue 
that the more rapid and sustained rise in prices in the Republican zone was one of the 
key factors that tipped the balance of resources towards the Francoists. The question is, 
then, why did the Republicans suffer higher inflation? Is the higher inflation rate 
definite proof of gross economic mismanagement on behalf of the Republican 
government? 
The more intensive use of the Bank of Spain by the Republican Treasury has 
been considered the key element behind the difference in inflation rates. But the 
evidence presented above suggests that both sides resorted to the central banks. 
Furthermore, the percentage increase in the quantity of money was quite similar, as is 
apparent in table 11. In the Republican zone, money supply increased rapidly and, by 
March 1939, the public had about four times the amount of money in their hands than at 
the beginning of the war (a quarterly growth rate of 14%). The stock of money in the 
Francoist zone grew at a slower rate at first, but as Franco’s Army extended the territory 
under its control, the money in circulation multiplied by nearly 6.5 (a quarterly growth 
rate of  18%).  
However, when comparing the change in the stock of money in both zones, it is 
also necessary to consider the size of the economy. As there are no figures available for 
the production as a whole, we take the population as an acceptable proxy. The figures 
for money per capita are also shown in table 12. As population dwindled in the 
Republican territory, the quantity of money per capita rose six-fold (a quarterly growth 
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rate of 18%)25. On the contrary, as the population in the Francoist zone grew, the per 
capita quantity of money only increased four-fold (a quarterly growth rate of 14%). As a 
result, the money supply grew at a faster rate in the Republican zone in per capita terms.  
 
Table 11. Monetary Supply (pesetas) 
 
Money supply* 
(million) Money per capita 
 
Francoist 
zone 
Republican 
zone 
Francoist 
zone 
Republican 
zone 
1936 (July) 2,299 6,595 230 441 
1936 (December) 2,378 9,083 193 720 
1937 (June)  3,440 12,194   
1937 (December) 5,166 17,053 355 1,601 
1938 (June)  6,971 20,929   
1938 (December) 9,239 26,613 592 2,620 
1939 (March)** 14,873 28,027 952 2,758 
* Includes currency and short term deposits ** Population as of 31.12.1938. 
Sources: Money supply in Miguel (1944), population at the end of each year in Ortega and Silvestre 
(2006), population in July 1936 in Martín-Aceña (2004) 
 
Although the decline in population and the resulting excess liquidity 
contributed to inflation in the Republican zone, figure 3 provides evidence that other 
significant factors were at work. The figure shows that the price lines did not 
shadow population losses. For instance, until December 1936 when the population 
fell by 2.3 million in the Republican zone, prices rose in line with the money supply. 
In contrast, from December 1936, when the population decreased by a much lesser 
extent, prices increased significantly more rapidly than the quantity of money. 
                                                 
25
  Population figures come from new estimates  by Ortega and Silvestre (2006) 
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Figure 3. Money and prices (July 1936=100) 
0,0
50,0
100,0
150,0
200,0
250,0
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
pt
em
be
r
O
ct
o
be
r
N
o
v
em
be
r
D
ec
em
be
r
Ja
n
u
ar
y
Fe
br
u
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
pr
il
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
pt
em
be
r
O
ct
o
be
r
1936 1937
Money franq
Money reps
Prices franq
Prices rep
Prices cat
 Sources: Miguel (1944). For the price index for Catalonia, Maluquer de Motes (2008) 
 
One factor that might explain why prices rose more than the stock of money is a 
downturn in production not related to the fall in population. Although recent studies 
have suggested that agrarian and industrial production did not collapse in the area 
controlled by the Republican government, as is frequently asserted, the truth is that 
there were marked energy and raw material shortages as well as a widespread scarcity 
of food and consumer goods in the Republican zone26. This was a consequence of the 
unbalanced distribution of population and agrarian supplies between the Republican and 
Francoist zones. While the largest part of the population was in the Republican area, the 
agrarian producing area, particularly that of grain, potatoes, meat and fish, was under 
the control of Franco’s army. Moreover, Republican Spain was divided into two 
separate geographical areas, which restricted the transportation and distribution of raw 
materials, food and industrial goods. As a result, we must conclude that a greater 
imbalance between cash in circulation and total output did contribute to the escalation 
of wholesale prices in the Republican zone. Moreover, the fact that prices rose by more 
than the stock of money and more than the decline in output justifies, means that 
velocity rose as well. Velocity might have risen because inflation itself discouraged the 
public from holding cash, adding to the pressure on prices. 
Political factors may also explain the faster increase in Republican prices. The 
regional authorities and revolutionary organizations printed their own money as a way 
                                                 
26
 Catalan (2006) and Martínez Ruiz (2006b) 
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of asserting their political independence. Consequently, there was a boom in banknotes 
and coins in the Republican zone27. The fact that numerous issuing centres were 
operating (the central government, the autonomous governments and many other 
regional and local institutions) and the variety of currencies in circulation undermined 
the credibility of the Republican peseta. The Republican government failed to see this 
problem and did not put a stop to the anarchical situation until autumn 1937. The 
continuous military setbacks suffered by the Republican Army was another  factor that 
fuelled inflation, as people lost faith in the currency and fled from it. 
The currency war declared by the Francoist against the Republican peseta should 
also be taken into consideration28. Rebel authorities declared all banknotes issued after 
July 1936 by the Republican Bank of Spain illegal, while at the same time approving 
the issue of new banknotes to be put in circulation by the newly created nationalist Bank 
of Spain. This decision generated anxiety and uncertainty among the population, 
particularly in the zones close to the front lines. When they anticipated that  Franco’s 
troops would launch a final attack to overrun the territory, they disposed of their 
Republican pesetas, which were worthless if the village was occupied, buying as much 
scarce tangible goods as they could. After the occupation of the industrial North, in the 
summer of 1937, Francoists took further action that put additional pressure on the 
Republican economy. An act was passed blocking all current accounts and bank 
deposits opened or increased after the outbreak of the war. Again, when news of the 
advance of the Franco army reached the population in Republican cities, holders of 
deposits reacted by transforming them into cash and then into goods and services. Prices 
simply rose to clear the market. 
  
 
                                                 
27
 Martorell (2006) 
28
 This has been extensively studied by Sanchez Asiain (1999) 
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5. Conclusion 
According to our new estimates, the two contenders consumed approximately 
the same amount of domestic and foreign resources. Table 12 summarizes the 
information included in tables 6 and 10. The figures are sufficiently clear and do not 
need more than a few final comments. Both sides spent about 2,000 million dollars, at 
1936 prices, a far from negligible amount. Two thirds were obtained from domestic 
sources, mainly money creation, and spent in the domestic markets. The rest was 
acquired abroad and the two combatants used that money to pay for all sorts of supplies 
in foreign markets. 
 
Table 12. Total Resources (millions of dollars 1936) 
 
Francoist 
administration 
Republican 
government 
External resources 760 769 
Domestic resources 1,282 1,086 
TOTAL 2,042 1,855 
 
Note: For the exchange rate of the peseta see Svennilson (1954) 
Source: table 6 and table 10 
 
The financial decisions made by the two contenders shared a common objective: 
to win the war. This was the main focus of their financial strategies. Although the 
militarization of the economy was apparent in the case of the Franco zone, the 
Republican government also concentrated its energies on the military, which is apparent 
when examining the increasing proportion of military expenses in the budget. As this 
last argument has been frequently questioned, it is worth emphasizing. Nevertheless, 
despite having the same amount of resources, the Republicans obtained less and lower 
quality military equipment and supplies. Inefficiency or inexperience was not the main 
cause. The insurmountable obstacles imposed by the non-intervention agreement to buy 
arms legally in the markets of the producing nations were much more relevant. In 
contrast, Franco received a constant flow of arms from his ideological allies, Germany 
and Italy. Besides, the supplies to the nationalists were sent on credit and payment 
postponed to the end of the war.  
What lesson can be learnt from the Spanish civil war concerning the relationship 
between its final outcome and the volume of resources employed by the two parties in 
the conflict? Was the result of the Spanish civil war different from what was expected, 
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given the initial distribution of wealth and resources? We have seen that, although the 
territory controlled by the Republican government was wealthier than the regions under 
the rebel army, this initial advantage could not be transformed into a greater capacity to 
meet the needs of war. In the early weeks of the conflict, the Republican government, 
taken aback by the revolt of part of the Army and having to face severe internal turmoil, 
suffered a series of military defeats. As a consequence, the Republican State lost almost 
half of the territory that was taken over by insurgents. Moreover, the so-called non-
intervention accord hindered the acquisition of war material from foreign suppliers. 
After a year, the question was not whether the revolt would succeed, but how long the 
Republic would be able to resist. As time went by and Franco’s army inflicted further 
defeats on the increasingly demoralized Republican troops, the market began to 
anticipate the victory of the nationalist side. The Republic´s ongoing internal political  
disputes and the economic difficulties that plagued the population in Republican 
territory also contributed to the belief that the winning party was on the other side of the 
front. The lack of confidence in the political chances of the Republic and dwindling 
financial and material resources led economic agents to flee from the Republican peseta, 
which in turn fuelled uncontrolled inflation caused by excessive money issuing. We 
believe that the Spanish Republic did not lose the war because of a lack of resources. 
The Republicans lost the war due to the constraints imposed by the non-intervention 
agreement, due the absence of internal political cohesion and also to early military 
setbacks, which altogether prevented the Republican government from converting its 
initial economic and financial superiority into military superiority. 
 
 27
Bibliography 
 
Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, A. (2005) Un año con Queipo de Llano, memorias de 
un nacionalista, Sevilla: Espuela de Plata. 
 
Broadberry, S. and Harrison, M. (eds) (2005), The Economics of World War I, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cárdenas Sánchez, E. and Manns, C. (1992) “Inflación y estabilización monetaria en 
México durante la revolución” in E.Cárdenas (ed.) Historia económica de México, 
México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 
Catalan, J. (2006) “Guerra e industria en la dos Españas, 1936-1939” in Martín-Aceña, 
P. and Martínez Ruiz, E. (eds.) La economía de la Guerra Civil, Marcial Pons: Madrid  
 
Comín, F. and Díaz Fuentes, D. (2005) “Sector público administrativo y Estado del 
bienestar”, Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid: Fundación 
BBVA, pp. 873-965. 
 
Comín, F. and López, S. (2008) “La Hacienda del gobierno de la República española 
(1936-1939)” in Fuentes Quintana, E. (dir), Economía y Economistas españoles en la 
Guerra Civil, vol. II. Barcelona: Galaxia-Guteberg, pp. 851-899. 
 
Delgado, I. (1980), Portugal e a guerra civil de Espanha, Lisboa: Publicaçoes Europa-
America. 
 
Fuentes Quintana, E. (dir) (2008), Economía y Economistas españoles en la Guerra 
Civil, Barcelona: Galaxia-Guteberg 
 
García Pérez, R. (1994), Franquismo y Tercer Reich, Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales. 
 
Gatrell, P. (1994) “The First World War and War Comunism, 1914-1920” in Davies, 
R.W., Harrison, M. and Wheatcroft, S.G. (eds), The economic transformation of the 
Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Generalitat de Cataluña (1937),  La Política Financiera de la Generalitat durante la 
revolución y la guerra. Barcelona. 
 
Giura, V. (2002), Tra política ed economia. L’Italia e la guerra civile spagnola, Roma-
Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
 
Gómez-Galvarriato, A. and Muccachio, A. (2000), “Un nuevo índice de precios para 
México, 1886-1929” in El Trimestre Económico, 67, pp.47-91. 
 
Harrison, M. (ed.) (1998), The Economics of World War II: six great powers in 
international comparison, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Howson, G. (1998), Arms for Spain : the untold story of the Spanish Civil War, 
London, J. Murray. 
 28
 
Hubbard J. R. (1953),  "How Franco Financed His War", Journal of Modern History, 
25, pp. 390-406.  
 
Leitz, C. (1996), Economic relations between Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain 1936-
1945. Oxford: Oxford U.P. 
 
Malefakis, E. (dir) (2006), La Guerra Civil Española, Madrid: Taurus. 
 
Maluquer de Motes i Bernet, J. (2008) “Inflación y guerra: la evolución del nivel 
general de precios en las dos Españas (1936-1939)” in Fuentes Quintana, E. (dir), 
Economía y Economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, vol. II, Barcelona: Galaxia-
Guteberg, pp. 1121-1140. 
 
Martín-Aceña, P. (1994) “Los problemas monetarios al término de la Guerra Civil” in 
Hacienda Pública Española, 2, pp. 63-88 
 
Martín-Aceña, P. (2001), El Oro de Moscú y el Oro de Berlín. Madrid: Taurus. 
 
Martín-Aceña, P. (2008) “El oro del Banco de España y la guerra civil", E. Fuentes 
Quintana (dir), Economía y Economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, vol. II. 
Barcelona: Galaxia-Guteberg, pp. 1079-1120. 
 
Martín-Aceña, P. and Martínez Ruiz, E. (eds.) (2006), La economía de la Guerra Civil, 
Marcial Pons, Madrid. 
 
Martín-Aceña, P., Martínez Ruiz, E. and Pons, M.A. (2010) “The financing of the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939” in Patrice Baubeau and Anders Ögren (eds.), Convergence 
and Divergence of National Financial Systems: Evidence from the Gold Standards, 1871-1971, 
London: Pickering&Chatto.  
 
Martínez Ruiz, E. (2006a), Guerra civil, comercio y capital extranjero. El sector exterior 
de la economía española (1936-1939), Madrid: Banco de España. 
 
Martínez Ruiz, E.(2006b)  “El campo en guerra: organización y producción agraria” in 
Martín-Aceña, P. and Martínez Ruiz, E. (eds.), La economía de la Guerra Civil, Marcial 
Pons: Madrid 
 
Martorell, M. (2006) “Una guerra, dos pesetas” en Martín-Aceña, P. and Martínez Ruiz, 
E. (eds.) (2006), La economía de la Guerra Civil, Marcial Pons: Madrid, pp. 329-356. 
 
Martorell, M. and Comín, F. (2008) “La Hacienda de guerra franquista” in Fuentes 
Quintana, E. (dir), Economía y Economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, vol. II, 
Barcelona: Galaxia-Guteberg, pp. 901-937. 
 
Miguel, A. de (1944), "Fundamentos técnicos para la construcción de una escala de 
desbloqueo. El tránsito de la peseta roja a la peseta nacional", Moneda y Crédito, 11, 
pp.9-24. 
 
 29
Ministerio de Hacienda (1940), Resumen provisional sobre la evolución de la Hacienda 
desde el 18 de julio de 1936 hasta el presente, Madrid. 
 
Moradiellos, E. (2001), El reñidero de Europa. Las dimensiones internacionales de la 
Guerra Civil española, Barcelona: Ediciones Península 
 
Oliveira, C. (1987), Salazar e a guerra civil de Espanha, Lisboa, O Jornal 
 
Ortega, J.A. and Silvestre, J. (2006) “Las consecuencias demográficas” in Martín-
Aceña, P. and Martínez Ruiz, E. (eds.) (2006), La economía de la Guerra Civil, Marcial 
Pons: Madrid, pp. 53-101 
 
Pons, M.A. (2006), “La Hacienda pública y la financiación de la guerra” in Martín-
Aceña, P. and Martínez Ruiz, E. (eds.) (2006), La economía de la Guerra Civil, Marcial 
Pons: Madrid, pp. 357-391. 
 
Ransom, R.L. (2001), “The economics of the civil war”, EH Net Encyclopedia, edited 
by Robert Whaples , August 25, URL 
 
Sánchez Asiaín, J. A.(1999), Economía y finanzas en la guerra civil española (1936-
1939). Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia. 
 
Sánchez Recio, G. (1991), La República contra los rebeldes y los desafectos. La 
represión económica durante la guerra civil. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante. 
 
Sardá, J.(1970), “El Banco de España, 1931-1962”, El Banco de España. Una historia 
económica, Madrid: Banco de España,  pp.421-479 
 
Svennilson, I. (1954), Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, Geneva, U.N. 
Economic Comission for Europe 
 
Velarde Fuertes, J.(1999) “Aspectos económicos de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)” in M. 
Alonso Baquer, La guerra civil española. Sesenta años después, Madrid: Actas, pp.367- 
396. 
 
Viñas, A (1976), El oro español en la Guerra Civil, Madrid: Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales. 
 
Viñas, A. (1977), La Alemania nazi y el 18 de julio. Madrid: Alianza. 
 
Viñas, A. (1984), Guerra, dinero, dictadura, ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de 
Franco. Barcelona: Crítica.  
 
Viñas, A. (2008), "Armas y hombres para España. Los apoyos exteriores en la guerra 
civil", E. Fuentes Quintana (dir), Economía y Economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, 
vol I. Barcelona: Galaxia-Guteberg, pp. 339-424 
 
Whealey R. (1986), ”How Franco financed his war—Reconsidered” in Blinkorn M (ed), 
Spain in conflict 1931-1939. Democracy and its enemies, London: Sage Publications, 
pp. 245-263. 
